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THE GLOBAL COURT: THE INTERNATIONALIZATION
OF COMMERCIAL ADJUDICATION AND ARBITRATION
Charles N. Brower*

I begin with first principles: The story of the twentieth century
is that of the dilution, the dissipation, and, in' some areas, the virtual disappearance of state power. Due in varying parts to the advance of technology, principally communications technology, to pervasive abuses of state power, and to various tendencies to anarchy,
this shift in the locus of authority arises in significant part from a
widespread popular realization that the collective public responsibility of the state cannot successfully substitute on a broad basis for individual responsibility privately exercised.
To be sure, there are exceptions. Notably in Europe, the authority of states has given way in important measure, not to the private sector, but instead to the supranational sway of European political institutions wielding public authoiity. By and large, however,
privatization abounds: Formerly nationally-owned entities, including
even gas and electricity providers as well as airlines, become privatelyowned; army cooks frequently no longer are military personnel, but instead are contracted from industrial food service suppliers; even jails are operated by profit-seeking entrepreneurs.
Behind all of this there stands, nonetheless, and there must remain, however residually, the ultimate behavior-enforcing authority
of the state. The "private versus public" debate always has been over
the relative allocation of authority between the two; the complete
elimination of state regulatory prerogatives would be at least as disastrous as was the attempted eradication of private property in the
late, unlamented socialist economies. But - and this is the n~b of
it - the relative reduction in the role of states today necessarily
means also internationalization, or globalization.
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Nowhere is this more evident than in the means by which legal
disputes involving international commerce and foreign investment
increasingly are adjudicated outside of any national system of
courts, even where they directly involve states as parties. I am speaking, of course, of the growth in private international arbitration of
such disputes that formerly were heard in national courts. Specifically, I refer to that system whereby parties of different nationalities
agree to mandatory and binding arbitration of disputes that may
arise, or have arisen, between them, pursuant to a particular set of
arbitration rules, usually before a panel composed of three independent and impartial persons of different nationalities, who also come
from disparate legal traditions and whom the parties themselves
have selected.
The growth of such privatized adjudication has been nothing
less than explosive. For many years the International Chamber of
Commerce International Court of Arbitration, established in Paris
in 1923, held the. field" alone; it was the only serious player. It took
fifty-three years for it to receive its first 3,000 cases; the next 3,000,
however, came in just eleven years} In more recent times other institutions have sprung up alongside it like wild flowers proliferating
in a summer meadow: The London Court of International Arbitration and the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre, for example, as well as various other regional, national, provincial, and
even sector counterparts. In 1976 the United Nations General Assembly itself entered the field with its promulgation of the Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law (UNCITRAL). The founding of the International Federation of Commercial Arbitration Institutions in 1985 with seventy
charter members itself confirmed this growth; its expansion subsequently to embrace ninety members has reconfirmed it. All of these
systems are available to disputants worldwide, and, despite the differences in them, are fundamentally the same.
As already suggested, this growth in private adjudication is
matched stride for stride, indeed it is made possible by the concomitant convergence of relevant national laws and the elaboration of
facilitative international agreements, resulting in the internationalization of adjudicated commercial dispute resolution.
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Any arbitration necessarily is subject to the national law of the
state in which it takes place. Statutes in major industrial jurisdictions have been modernized so as to minimize state intervention in
the arbitral process itself, while offering judicial review to the extent
necessary to ensure the integrity of the process by which the arbitral
tribunal arrived at its award. To the same end UNCITRAL in 1985
fashioned a Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration
designed to provide an "off the shelf" statute for adoption by less
sophisticated jurisdictions and to encourage greater convergence, if
not uniformity, on the part of others. It has been adopted, albeit
with variations, in a considerable number of jurisdictions.
At the same time, the international community has adopted a
series of conventions and treaties ensuring mutual and uniform enforcement of agreements to arbitrate, and also of the resulting
awards, of which the New York Convention of 1958 is the most
prominent. In 1965 the World Bank went so far as to establish, pursuant to convention, the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), and with it, a completely self-contained
regime for deciding investment disputes. So effective are these systems that today an international arbitral award is worth far more
than a judgment of a national court abroad; the former is subject to
comparatively automatic enforcement, whereas the latter mUst be
made the subject of a plenary suit.
This three-tiered and essentially global system, consisting of private adjudication under agreed rules, supported by only the most
limited national regulation necessary to ensure its integrity, and an
international exercise of state power to the extent required to guarantee enforcement of the results, is based on the parties' reciprocal
mistrust of state power. This mistrust takes a special form, however.
It is not mistrust of state power per se; rather it is the lack of faith
on the part of each party that the courts of the other party's state
of nationality in fact will administer justice fairly and impartially. In
short, neither party wishes to be judged in the other's "backyard."
In addition, relative detachment of the process from state power facilitates a degree of internationalization, and consequent uniformity, which has its own merits for international commerce, but which
otherwise would be unattainable.
This trend goes much deeper, however, than the adjudicatory
process itself; it goes also to the heart of the matter, the applicable
substantive law. Just as trading partners who are foreign to each
other eschew each other's courts, so, too, do they prefer not to be
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judged by each other's national legal norms. This concern is highest, of course, where one of the parties is itself a state or a peristaltic enterprise. In such circumstances the parties, with increasing frequency, will concoct for themselves a jurisprudential corpus that
either is divorced from any national system of law or combines a
relevant national legal system with another body of law to supplement or modify it and which any national court system would have
considerable difficulty to apply. For example, under the 1955 Libyan
Petroleum Law, the law applicable to oil concession agreements in
that country (some of which still are in effect), it is provided that
the applicable law is "the law[] of Libya and such rules and principles of international law as may be relevant but only to the extent
that such' rules and principles are not inconsistent with and do not
conflict with the laws of Libya."2 Another example is Article 42(1)
of the 1965 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes
Between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID Convention), .
which provides that in the absence of any other agreement on the
matter "the Tribunal shall apply the law of the Contracting State
party to the dispute (including its rules on the conflict of laws) and
such rules of international law as may be applicable."3 Another favorite source is the lex mercatoria, a concept reflected, inter alia, in
Article 13(5) of the Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce, providing that "[i]n all cases
the arbitrator shall take account of the provisions of the contract
and the relevant trade usages." In 1994 the International Institute
for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) promulgated Principles of International Commercial Contracts,4 a compendium of
principles derived from both the civil law and common law traditions, which a 1997 report of UNIDROIT on their implementation
confirms now are frequently adopted by name as the governing law
in contracts. Finally, Article V of the Claims Settlement Declaration
between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States of
America establishing the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, which
has adjudicated hundreds of commercial claims of American businesses and individuals against Iranian entities, provides as follows:
2. Robert B. Von Mehren 8c P. Nicholas Kourides, International Arbitrations Between
States and Foreign Private Parties: The Libyan NationaJ.iuJtiIm Cases, 75 AM. J INT'L
L 477, 482 n.22 (1981).
3. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and
Other States, Mar. 18, 1965,575 V.N.T.S. 159.
4. INTERNATIONAL 1NSITI1JTE FOR THE UNIFlCATION OF PRIvATE LAw. PluNOPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL CoMMEROAL CoNTRACTS (1994).
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The Tribunal shall decide all cases on the basis of respect
for law, applying such choice of law rules and principles of
commercial and international law as the Tribunal determines to be applicable, taking into account relevant usages
of the trade, contract provisions and changed
circumstances. S
The fact that this "global court" works, and works well, is
proven by its consistent triumph over adversity. Numerous arbitrations against foreign parties, including pariah governments such as,
in recent years, Libya, have proceeded to a conclusion, with payment being achieved, notwithstanding the most determined efforts
of some defendants to disrupt, or even to abort, the proceedings.
Tactics to this end have included failure to appoint an arbitrator, or
appointment of a patently biased arbitrator; refusal to appear, or alternating sporadic appearances with demonstrative "walkouts" and
other intentional absences; unwarranted objections to jurisdiction;
unjustified challenges to the service of particular arbitrators, or
even attempts to intimidate them; and all manner of lesser forms of
abuse of the process. In one famous case at the Iran-United States
Claims Tribunal two Iranian judges even assaulted an elderly Swedish colleague. In the end, none of these tactics succeeds, however,
because all modem sets of arbitral rules provide the means for demolishing or overlooking such obstacles and are backed, as noted a
moment ago, by indispensable attachment to state power.
In conclusion, let me say that based on my by now rather considerable experience in this "global court," as counsel both for private parties and for states, for defendants as well as claimants, and
as arbitrator and judge, I firmly believe that by and large the results
that it achieves are as just as are those experienced in the preferred
national court systems of highly developed jurisdictions. Moreover,
for those privileged to participate in its proceedings it is indeed
highly enjoyable and rewarding.
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